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Abstract
I construct a search model to formalize the intuitive idea that sellers hold sales
to attract buyers and build customer relationships. The market consists of a large
number of buyers and sellers. All sellers sell a homogeneous good and all buyers
have the same publicly known valuation of the good. Buyers know the terms of trade
oﬀered by sellers before choosing which seller to visit. A buyer is related to a seller
if the buyer just bought a good from the seller and the relationship is broken if the
buyer fails to continue to buy from the seller. Sellers are restricted to oﬀer the same
price to all buyers, but they are allowed to give priority to their related buyers. I
prove that there is an equilibrium in which a seller gives priority to the related buyer
and a buyer makes repeat purchases from the related seller. In the equilibrium, a
seller who does not have a related buyer posts a low (sale) price to attract the buyers
who are unrelated to any seller and, once the seller is related to a buyer after a trade,
the seller will post a high (regular) price to sell only to the related buyer. The fraction
of related sellers is endogenous in the equilibrium. I calibrate the steady state of the
model to the data and ﬁnd that the sale price represents a sizable markdown, and the
regular price a sizable markup, on the marginal cost. With the calibrated model, I
examine comparative statics and dynamics of the equilibrium with respect to changes
in the cost of and the demand for the good.
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Canada.1. Introduction
Sales are common in the retail market. In the microdata collected monthly by the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics on goods and services that cover 70% of consumer expenditure,
about 11% of all price quotes are sales (see Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, and Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2008). Sales represent a signiﬁcant fraction of the size and the frequency
of price changes. The average sale price in the BLS microdata is about 25% to 30% oﬀ
the regular price, depending on the estimation method. Excluding sales increases the
median duration of prices from 3.7 months to 7.2 months (Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008).
Moreover, sale prices seem to respond to shocks diﬀerently from regular prices. These
empirical regularities of sales pose a challenge for macro models that rely on price rigidity
to explain aggregate propagation, because most of those models do not incorporate sales.
On the other hand, there is a sizable literature on sales in industrial organization (see a
brief review later) that is not designed to explain the regularities of sales in large markets.
In this paper, I formulate a theory of sales in a large market and calibrate the model to
the data to investigate the model’s comparative statics and dynamics.
The theory formalizes the intuitive idea that sellers hold sales to attract buyers and build
customer relationships. Consider a market with a large number of buyers and sellers, where
sellers sell one indivisible unit of a homogeneous good and buyers have the same publicly
known valuation of the good. In each period, buyers observe the terms of trade oﬀered
by sellers before choosing which seller to visit. Suppose that buyers cannot coordinate on
their visiting decisions and they cannot switch sellers within the same period. Because of
these frictions, a seller may fail to get a visitor in a period and a buyer may fail to be
selected by the seller he visits. In this environment, there is a tradeoﬀ between the price
of the good and the probability of trade. Individuals on the two sides of the market may
want to form relationships in order to increase the probability of trade. Suppose that a
seller treats a buyer who bought from him in the previous period as the related buyer and
can reward the relationship with the priority of trade over unrelated buyers. However, to
conform with the deﬁnition (e.g., in the BLS data) that a sale is a price cut available to
all buyers, suppose that a seller is not allowed to oﬀer one price to the related buyer and
another price to unrelated buyers.1
1In reality, sellers may oﬀer price discounts through frequent customer memberships. However, ab-
1I characterize the equilibrium in which it is optimal for a seller to give priority to the
related buyer and optimal for a buyer to make repeat purchases from the related seller.
Like most relationships, the informal relationship described in this model generates beneﬁts
to the partners intertemporally and has implications on prices. For a buyer, forming the
relationship with a seller enables him to have a higher probability of trade in the future
with the related seller. Recognizing this beneﬁt to the buyer, a seller who has a related
buyer will charge a high (regular) price on the good that will make the related buyer just
indiﬀerent between visiting him and visiting an unrelated seller. Anticipating this high
price as the return to a relationship, a seller who does not have a related buyer posts a low
(sale) price in order to attract customers and acquire a relationship. The equilibrium has
complete separation between related and unrelated individuals: while related buyers only
visit their related sellers and pay the regular price, unrelated buyers only visit sellers who
do not have related buyers and pay the sale price.
The fraction of related sellers is endogenous. A relationship is broken if the buyer fails
to visit the related seller. To avoid the trivial case where all individuals on the shorter side
of the market are related, I introduce exogenous separation from a relationship in the form
of a taste shock that makes a buyer inactive in a period. Thus, a buyer may fail to show up
at the related seller, in which case the relationship is destroyed. This ﬂow of sellers out of
relationships and the opposite ﬂow of unrelated sellers who acquire relationships through
trade determine the dynamics of the fraction of related sellers.
Because the fraction of sellers who are unrelated is always positive, the fraction of sellers
who hold sales in any given period is positive. Similarly, because a seller has a positive
probability of losing a relationship, each seller holds sales regularly over time. The model
has precise predictions on the frequency, the duration and the price discount of sales. These
features of sales depend diﬀerently on the extensive and intensive margins of the market.
The extensive margin of the demand has two dimensions: the buyer/seller ratio and the
probability that a buyer is active in a period. The intensive margin of the market consists
of the utility of consuming a good and the marginal cost of a good. In the steady state, the
stracting from price discrimination enables me not only to focus on sales as price cuts available to all
buyers, but also to make the results on sales more robust. If a seller is allowed to use price to discriminate
buyers, it is easy to generate a diﬀerential between the price posted by a seller with a related buyer and
the price posted by a seller without a related buyer. For search models of the labor market that allow for
ﬁrms to post wages contingent on the worker’s type, see Shi (2002, 2006).
2frequency of sales, the duration of a sale and the fraction of related sellers in the market
depend only on the extensive margin and not on the intensive margin of the market. In
contrast, prices, markups and price discounts of sales depend on both margins.
To investigate the predictions of the model more speciﬁcally, I calibrate the steady
state of the model to the data. The identiﬁed model reveals that the sale price is below
the marginal cost, i.e., a markdown on the marginal cost, while the regular price is a
positive markup on the marginal cost. The markdown is 18.9%, the markup is 12.7%,
and the average markup weighted by the transaction frequency is 11.3%. Thus, customer
relationships induce large variations in retail prices.
With the identiﬁed model, I examine ﬁrst comparative statics and then dynamics of the
equilibrium with respect to changes in the parameters. Relegating the details to subsections
4.2 and 4.3, I mention some of the results here. First, the duration of a sale reﬂects changes
in market conditions more accurately than do price-related variables such as markups and
price discounts of sales. While markups and price discounts can respond to market con-
ditions non-monotonically, the duration of a sale always responds monotonically. Second,
the two dimensions of the extensive margin of the demand aﬀect prices diﬀerently. An
increase in the demand arising from a higher buyer/seller ratio increases the average price
of the good, but an increases in the demand arising from a higher probability that a buyer
is active in the market can reduce the price, which may explain the paradoxical ﬁnding
in the data by Chevalier et al. (2003). Third, an increase in the marginal cost of the
good induces relatively large and non-linear reductions in the markdown and the markup,
thus narrowing the gap between the regular price and the sale price. The reduction in the
markdown is larger in percentage terms than in the markup, indicating that the regular
price is more stable than the sale price. Fourth, in the short run, a shock to the demand
typically induces prices and the duration of a sale to overshoot the steady state because the
fraction of related sellers (as an aggregate state variable) is temporarily outside the steady
state. However, this fraction adjusts relatively quickly toward the steady state. Finally, I
examine how free entry of sellers aﬀects the equilibrium by aﬀecting the buyer/seller ratio.
In this model, search is directed in the sense that buyers know the terms of trade before
choosing which seller to visit. Thus, the model is related to the growing literature on di-
rected search. This literature is divided into two approaches. One assumes that a market
3i so r g a n i z e di nm a n ys u b m a r k e t se a c ho ﬀering speciﬁc terms of trade and that an exoge-
nous matching function determines the number of matches inside each submarket (e.g.,
Montgomery, 1991, Moen, 1997, Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, and Shi, 2009). The other
approach derives the matching function endogenously from the equilibrium of individuals’
strategies (e.g., Peters, 1991, and Burdett et al., 2001). In this paper I follow the second
approach in order to capture explicitly how a seller’s decision on whether to give priority
to the related buyer aﬀects the seller’s trading probability. To my knowledge, it is new to
use a directed search model to explain customer relationship and sales.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo ns a l e sh a saf e ws t r a n d s . T h eﬁrst strand relies on the result that
when sellers face a discontinuous demand curve, there is an equilibrium in which each
seller follows a mixed strategy to determine the posted price (Shilony, 1977). Extending
this result, some authors interpret price reductions in the mixed strategy as sales. For
example, Salop and Stiglitz (1982) introduce durability of the product and Varian (1980)
introduces heterogeneity in buyers’ valuation. Interesting as it is, the interpretation of
price variations in a mixed strategy as sales seems too dubious to match the regularity and
the duration of sales in the data. Moreover, the mixed strategy may be puriﬁed when there
are a large number of sellers and buyers, as in Burdett and Judd (1983). The second strand
of the literature is based on the elegant model by Sobel (1984). In Sobel’s model, there is
a constant ﬂow of buyers entering the market in each period who are either high-valuation
buyers local to particular sellers or low-valuation shoppers who can patiently wait for sales.
As the stock of patient shoppers builds up due to buyers’ entry, some sellers cut prices to
clear this stock of patient shoppers. This model has precise predictions on the frequency
and the price discount of sales, but the duration of a sale is one period. Related to but
diﬀerent from this model is the one by Lazear (1986), where sellers hold sales to clear the
inventory of goods rather than a stock of patient shoppers.2 Broadening this category of
models even further, one may include the so-called sS models in which sellers use sales to
manage inventory and/or prices (e.g., Slade, 1998, Aguirregabiria, 1999). The third strand
of the literature on sales contains signaling models in which a seller uses promotional sales
to signal either the quality of the product (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) or the cost of
2In Lazear’s model, a seller does not know the value of the good to the buyers and learns about the
distribution of such valuation from whether a good was sold at the previousely posted price. Sales are an
outcome of downward updating of the seller’s beliefs on buyers’ valuation of the good. Gonzalez and Shi
(2010) integrate a similar learning process into a search equilibrium of a large labor market.
4the product (e.g., Bagwell, 1987). Although inventory management and promotional sales
are important for some sales, many other sales are not motivated by these considerations.
In particular, promotional sales are likely to dissipate over time once buyers have learned
about the product, but sales in the data (e.g., Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008) can occur
on the same product regularly over time. Finally, most of these models cannot generate
markdowns observed in the data (e.g., Dutta et al., 2002).
In contrast to this literature, I emphasize customer relationships as a motive for sales.
There are two main reasons for constructing such a theory. First, it is common sense
that sellers use sales to attract buyers and build customer relationships. The marketing
literature (e.g., Blattberg and Sen, 1974) emphasizes the importance of customer loyalty
but takes customer loyalty as a primitive of the model. In my model, there is nothing hard-
wired about customer loyalty; instead, the relationship is endogenously generated through
trade. A buyer values the relationship only if the related seller oﬀers priority in trade, while
a seller values the relationship only if he can charge a higher price than an unrelated seller
does. Second, the above models on sales typically have a few sellers and/or buyers rather
than a large retail market. Some of the models are also diﬃcult to be made dynamic. In
contrast, my model has an inﬁnite horizon and many (in fact, inﬁnitely many) sellers and
buyers. These features make the model promising for macro analyses, although more work
is needed to enrich the model. To focus on the link between customer relationships and
sales, I deliberately abstract from some elements that are important in the above literature
on sales, such as durability of the good, heterogeneity in buyers’ preferences, and private
information in buyers’ valuation or the quality/cost of the product.
2. A Model of Directed Search with Customer Relationship
2.1. The model environment
Time is discrete and lasts forever. There are M sellers and N buyers, where M and N are
large numbers which I will take to the limit ∞.D e n o t eb = N/M as the buyer-seller ratio
and ﬁx b ∈ (0,∞) until section 5 where I will allow for free entry of sellers to determine
b. All individuals discount future at a rate r>0. In each period, a seller can produce
one indivisible unit of good, and the cost of producing a unit is c ≥ 0. Because goods
are perishable, however, a seller produces a good only after meeting a buyer. In any given
5period, a buyer needs to consume a good with probability λ ∈ (0,1) and does not have such
a need with probability (1 − λ). These taste shocks occur at the beginning of the period
and are independently and identically distributed among the buyers and across time. Call
a buyer who has the need to consume an active buyer, and a buyer who does not have the
need an inactive buyer. In each period, the number of active buyers is λN. The utility
of consumption is U (>c ) to an active buyer. Because the number of active buyers per
seller is bλ,Ir e f e rt obλ as the extensive margin of the demand, as opposed to the intensive
margin of the market which consists of U and c.
Although all sellers are identical in their production capacity and cost, they might have
had diﬀerent outcomes of selling in the previous period. If a seller sold a good in the
previous period to a buyer, the two individuals are related to each other. If a seller did
not sell a good in the previous period, the seller is unrelated. I focus on the equilibrium
with priority where sellers give priority to their related buyers; that is, if the related buyer
and some unrelated buyers both visit a seller, the seller sells the good to the related buyer
ﬁrst. I will ﬁnd a condition under which this choice of priority is optimal for a seller.
The fraction of sellers who have related buyers is denoted ρ, which is an aggregate state
variable. Because each related seller has one and only one related buyer, the number of
buyers who have related sellers is equal to ρM, and the number of active buyers who have
a related seller is λρM. The number of buyers who do not have related sellers is N − ρM
and the number of active buyers who do not have related sellers is λ(N −ρM). I will verify
later that ρ<min{1,b} in the equilibrium; that is, some sellers are unrelated to any buyer
and some buyers are unrelated to any seller.
In each period, sellers simultaneously post the terms of trade. After observing the terms
of trade, active buyers choose which seller to visit. Sellers must post the terms of trade
before knowing which buyer is active in the period, and each buyer must make the visiting
decision without knowing other buyers’ choices. Moreover, a seller must sell a good for
the same price independently of which type of buyer comes to him; that is, a seller is not
allowed to use price to discriminate diﬀerent buyers. As explained in the introduction, this
assumption is intended to capture the fact that a sale is available to all buyers. However,
a seller is allowed to give priority to the related buyer. If all visitors are unrelated to the
seller, the seller randomly selects one to trade with. Because a seller can give priority to
6the related buyer, a seller’s choice of price may depend on whether or not the seller has a
related buyer, i.e., whether or not the seller sold a good in the previous period.
A relationship between a buyer and a seller is informal, and the buyers are free to shop
at any seller. Moreover, a relationship ends when the buyer fails to visit the seller, either
because the buyer does not have the need to consume in the period or because the buyer
chooses to visit another seller. This assumption keeps the analysis tractable by reducing
an individual’s history from a potentially inﬁnite sequence to one of two numbers.3
2.2. A buyer’s decision and payoﬀ
In any arbitrary period, a buyer can be one of two “types”, denoted i ∈ {0,1}.I fi =1 ,
the buyer has a related seller, and if i = 0, the buyer does not have a related seller. Let
V a
i (ρ)d e n o t eat y p e - i active buyer’s value function, which is the maximum value that the
buyer can obtain in the market. Let Vi(ρ)d e n o t eat y p e - i buyer’s value at the end of the
previous period.4 The functions Vi and V a






i (ρ)+( 1− λ)V0(ρ+1)], i ∈ {0,1}. (2.1)
The subscripts “+1” indicate next period. This equation is intuitive. When a type-i buyer
at the end of the previous period looked forward, he expected to be active in the current
period with probability λ, in which case his value function is V a
i (ρ) ,a n dh ee x p e c t e dt ob e
inactive in the current period with probability 1 − λ, in which case he becomes unrelated
in the market and his value function is equal to V0(ρ+1). Discounting the expected value
of these two cases yields the value at the end of the previous period.
Consider the decision of a particular buyer after he becomes active in the period. If the
buyer does not have a related seller, he can visit one of two types of sellers, j ∈ {0,1}.I f
3Because the realization of a buyer’s taste shock is likely to be private information, it may be rational
for a seller to terminate a relationship when the related buyer does not show up. However, it is complicated
to explicitly model this decision under private information. Suppose that a buyer’s taste shock is publicly
observed. In the equilibrium I will establish later, a buyer is indiﬀerent between visiting the related seller
and visiting an unrelated seller. For a seller to keep a relationship with a buyer when the buyer is inactive
in the period, the seller must pay a positive amount to the buyer. Such a sidepayment amounts eﬀectively
to price discrimination, which is not allowed in this model.
4The fraction of sellers who are related to some buyers at the end of the previous period is the same as
that at the beginning of the current period, and there is no uncertainty about this aggregate state. Also,
since an individual’s state variable has only a ﬁnite number of values, I simplify the notation by putting
it as a subscript instead of an argument of the value function.
7j = 1, the seller has a related buyer, and if j = 0, the seller does not have a related buyer.
If the buyer has a related seller, he can visit one of three types of sellers, j ∈ {0,1,s}.
If j = 0, the seller is not related to any buyer; if j = 1, the seller is related to some
buyer but not to the speciﬁcb u y e ri nt h ed i s c u s s i o n ;a n di fj = s, the seller is related to
the speciﬁcb u y e r . L e tvij(ρ,p) denote the value to an active type-i buyer from visiting
an individual type-j seller who posts price p,w h e r eij ∈ {00,01,10,11,1s}.T h eb u y e r ’ s
choice is a probability θij(ρ,p) ∈ [0,1] with which the buyer visits the seller. Note that
vij(ρ,p) ≤ V a
i (ρ) for all i and j by the deﬁnition of V a






=0 , i fvij(ρ,p) <Va
1 (ρ)
∈ [0,1], if vij(ρ,p)=V a
0 (ρ),
(2.2)
where j ∈ {0,1,s} if i =1a n dj ∈ {0,1} if i =0 .
Note that θij is the probability that a type-i buyer visits an individual seller. When
the number of sellers goes to inﬁnity, θij is likely to approach zero, except for j = s.T o
characterize a buyer’s strategy in the limit, I deﬁne the (expected) queue length of buyers
for a seller. Recall that the number of active buyers who are related to some sellers is
λρM and the number of active buyers who are unrelated to any seller is λ(N − ρM). For
j ∈ {0,1},d e ﬁne the (expected) queue length of type-1 buyers visiting a type-j seller
posting price p as q1j(ρ,p) ≡ λρMθ1j(ρ,p), and the (expected) queue length of type-0
buyers visiting a type-0 seller as q0j(ρ,p) ≡ λ(N − ρM)θ0j(ρ,p).5
Let me calculate the value vij.C o n s i d e rﬁrst an active type-1 buyer. If the buyer visits
the seller he is related to, the buyer will be chosen by the seller with certainty. In this case,
the buyer will obtain net utility from consumption in the period, U −p1, and will have an
ex ante value V1(ρ+1) at the end of the period. If p is the price posted by the related seller,
then the buyer’s value of visiting the related seller is
v1s(ρ,p)=U − p + V1(ρ+1). (2.3)
If the buyer visits a seller who is not related to the buyer, then the buyer’s value is the
same as the value of a buyer who visits the same seller but is not related to any seller.
5As it is clear from this deﬁnition of the queue length, I follow the literature on directed search to focus
on the equilibrium where all buyers of the same type respond to a seller’s price (including deviations from
an equilibrium) in the same way (see Peters, 1991).
8That is, the following equalities hold for all p:
v11(ρ,p)=v01(ρ,p)a n dv10(ρ,p)=v00(ρ,p). (2.4)
Next, consider an active type-0 buyer and calculate v0j. I need to compute the probabil-
ity with which an active type-0 buyer will be chosen by a seller. Consider ﬁrst a particular
type-0 seller who posts price p and label him seller A. In the limit N, M →∞ ,t h e
particular buyer visiting seller A will be chosen to trade with by the seller with probability
1−e−(q10+q00)
q10+q00 ,w h e r eqi0 = qi0(ρ,p)f o ri ∈ {1,2} (see Appendix A for the derivation). Let me
explain this probability intuitively. The particular buyer is chosen by seller A if and only
if seller A receives at least one visitor and if the particular buyer is the chosen one. Since
the queue length of type-i buyers visiting seller A is qi0(ρ,p), where i ∈ {0,1},t h et o t a l
queue length of buyers visiting seller A is (q10 + q00). This queue length is the expected
number of buyers visiting seller A. The actual number of visitors is a random variable
generated by buyers’ visiting probabilities, θ10(ρ,p)a n dθ00(ρ,p). The probability that
seller A has at least one visitor is 1−e−(q10+q00). Conditional on having at least one visitor,
seller A randomly chooses one visitor to trade with, and each visitor is chosen with the
same probability. The unconditional probability that the particular buyer in the discussion
is the chosen one is 1−e−(q10+q00)
q10+q00 .
If a buyer is chosen by seller A, the buyer obtains utility U−p in the period. In addition,
the buyer becomes related to the seller and, relative to not trading, the relationship changes
the value for the buyer by V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1). Thus, the buyer’s surplus from the trade is




[U − p + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1)] + V0(ρ+1), (2.5)
where qi0 = qi0(ρ,p)f o ri ∈ {0,1}.
Now consider an active type-0 buyer visiting a particular type-1 seller who posts price
p, i.e., a seller who has a related buyer. The type-0 buyer will have a chance to be chosen
by the seller only if the seller’s related buyer does not visit the seller, which occurs with
probability (1 − λθ1s), where θ1s = θ1s(ρ,p). If all visitors to the seller are unrelated to
the seller, the particular type-0 buyer will be chosen to trade with by the seller with a
probability that can be calculated similarly to the above, with qi0 being replaced with qi1.





where qi1 = qi1(ρ,p)f o ri ∈ {0,1},a n dθ1s = θ1s(ρ,p). A trade gives the buyer utility
U −p in the period and, relative to not trading, the buyer’s value at the end of the period




[U − p + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1)] + V0(ρ+1), (2.6)
where qi1 = qi1(ρ,p)f o ri ∈ {0,1},a n dθ1s = θ1s(ρ,p).





=0 i fv1s(ρ,p) <Va
1 (ρ)
∈ [0,1] if v1s(ρ,p)=V a
1 (ρ),
(2.7)
qi1(ρ,p) ≥ 0a n dv01(ρ,p) ≤ V
a
i (ρ), i ∈ {0,1}, (2.8)
qi0(ρ,p) ≥ 0a n dv00(ρ,p) ≤ V
a
i (ρ), i ∈ {0,1}. (2.9)
In (2.8) and (2.9), the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Let P0 be the set of prices posted by unrelated sellers and P1 by related sellers. The
market value for an active buyer is:
V a
0 (ρ)=m a x j∈{0,1} maxp∈Pj v0j(ρ,p),
V a
1 (ρ)=m a x {v1s(ρ,p1), maxj∈{0,1} maxp∈Pj v1j(ρ,p)}.
(2.10)
2.3. A seller’s decision and payoﬀ
In any arbitrary period, a seller either has a related buyer (type-1) or has no related buyer
(type-0). Let J1(ρ) be the value function of a seller who has a related buyer and J0(ρ)t h a t
of a seller who does not have a related buyer. Both functions are measured at the end of
the previous period. To characterize a seller’s decision, consider a type-0 seller who posts a
price p0. Recall the assumption that a seller must set a price before knowing which buyer
is active. There are ρM type-1 buyers and, counting the probability that a buyer is active,
10each of these buyers visiting the seller with probability λθ10(ρ,p0). There are (N − ρM)
type-0 buyers each visiting the seller with probability λθ00(ρ,p0). In the limit M,N →∞ ,
the probability that the seller gets a buyer is:
1 − (1 − λθ10)
ρM(1 − λθ00)
N−ρM → 1 − e
−(q10+q00),
where θi0 = θi0(ρ,p0)a n dqi0 = qi0(ρ,p0)f o ri ∈ {0,1}.
When the seller has a trade, the current proﬁti sp0 − c and relative to no trading, the
seller’s value at the end of the period changes by [J1(ρ+1)−J0(ρ+1)]. Thus, the surplus to
the seller from the trade is [p0 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)]. The seller’s value function obeys







[p0 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] + J0(ρ+1)
o
s.t. (2.9), where qi0 = qi0(ρ,p0), i ∈ {0,1}. (2.11)
By incorporating (2.9) as a constraint, the seller explicitly takes into account the eﬀect of
the price choice on queue lengths of buyers visiting him. Also, as an implication of dynamic
programming, a seller’s current choice aﬀects whether the seller’s individual state in the
future will be 0 or 1 but does not aﬀect the form of future value functions.
Next consider a type-1 seller who posts a price p1. The related buyer visits the seller
with probability λθ1s(ρ,p1). A buyer whose related seller is someone else visits the seller
with probability λθ11(ρ,p1), and a buyer who does not have a related seller visits the seller
with probability λθ01(ρ,p1). Taking the limit M,N →∞and suppressing the arguments
(ρ,p1)o fθ1s, q11 and q01, I compute the probability that the seller has a trade as
1 − (1 − λθ1s)(1 − λθ11)
ρM(1 − λθ01)
N−ρM−1 → 1 − (1 − λθ1s)e
−(q11+q01).





1 − (1 − λθ1s)e−(q11+q01)
i
[p1 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] + J0(ρ+1)
o
s.t. (2.7) and (2.8), where (θ1s,q i0)=( θ1s,q i0)(ρ,p1), i ∈ {0,1}. (2.12)
With (2.7) and (2.8), the seller explicitly takes into account the eﬀect of the price choice
on the related buyer’s visiting probability and the queue length of unrelated buyers.
112.4. Equilibrium deﬁnition
With many sellers and many buyers in the economy, the analysis is tractable only for
equilibria which are symmetric in the sense that all individuals of the same type use the
same strategy. In the deﬁnition of queue lengths, I have already assumed that all buyers
o ft h es a m et y p er e s p o n dt oas e l l e r ’ sp r i c e( i ncluding a deviation) in the same way. If all
sellers of the same type also post the same terms of trade, they attract the same queue
length of visitors. In such a symmetric equilibrium, the set of prices posted by type-j
sellers is Pj = {pj},w h e r ej ∈ {0,1}. For now on, I will suppress the arguments (ρ,p0)o f
(θi0,q i0,v i0)a n d( ρ,p1)o f( θi1,θ 1s,q i1,v i1,v 1s), where i ∈ {0,1}.
A buyer’s visiting probabilities must addu pt oo n ea c r o s st h es e l l e r s .C o n s i d e rﬁrst a
type-1 buyer. The number of sellers related to the buyer is one, the number of sellers who
are related to other buyers but not to the particular buyer is (ρM −1), and the number of
sellers who do not have related buyers is (1−ρ)M. The buyer’s visiting probabilities must
satisfy: θ1s +( ρM − 1)θ11 +( 1− ρ)Mθ10 =1 .U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of the queue length, I
can rewrite this adding-up condition in the limit M,N →∞as follows:
ρq11 +( 1− ρ)q10 =( 1− θ1s)ρλ. (2.13)
Similarly, for a type-0 buyer, the visiting probabilities across the sellers must add up to
one: ρMθ01 +( 1− ρ)Mθ00 = 1, and the limit version of this condition is:
ρq01 +( 1− ρ)q00 =( b − ρ)λ. (2.14)
In the equilibrium, the fraction of related sellers, ρ, is endogenously determined by the
ﬂows of sellers between the two types. In a period, if a seller with a related buyer fails to
sell, the seller becomes unrelated. This happens with probability (1 − λθ1s)e−(q11+q01).I n
the reverse direction, a seller without a related buyer becomes related if the seller succeeds
in selling in the period. This occurs with probability 1−e−(q10+q00). The fraction of related
sellers in the market changes between the current and the next period as





− ρ(1 − λθ1s)e
−(q11+q01). (2.15)
Note that if θ1s = 1, which will be proven to hold in the equilibrium, then λ =1i m p l i e s
ρ = 1 in the steady state. This is why the assumption λ<1 is needed for ρ<1.
12An equilibrium with priority consists of buyers’ choices θij, buyers’ value functions
(V a
i ,V i,v ij)( w h e r ej ∈ {0,1,s} for i =1a n dj ∈ {0,1} for i = 0), sellers’ choices (p0,p 1),
sellers’ value functions (J0,J 1), and the fraction of related sellers ρ that satisfy:
(i) Buyers’ value functions (V a
i ,V i,v ij) satisfy (2.1), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.10);
(ii) Buyers’ choices θij and implied queue lengths, q1j = λρMθ1j and q0j = λ(N −ρM)θ0j,
satisfy (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.13), and (2.14);
(iii) Sellers’ value functions (J0,J 1) satisfy (2.11), (2.12) and J1 ≥ J0;
(iv) p0 solves (2.11) and p1 solves (2.12);
(v) The fraction of related sellers, ρ,s a t i s ﬁes (2.15).
Ih a v ee x p l a i n e dm o s to ft h er e q u i r e m e n t si nt h ea b o v ed e ﬁnition, except the inequality
J1 ≥ J0 in (iii). This inequality is necessary and suﬃcient for a seller to ﬁnd it optimal to
give priority to the related buyer. If J1 <J 0, a seller with a related buyer can increase his
value by treating all visitors in the same way.
3. Equilibrium Characterization
Under the maintained assumption λ<1, an equilibrium must have the feature that a buyer
obtains a strictly positive surplus from a trade. To see this, note that when λ<1, there
is a positive probability that a seller’s related buyer will not show up. In this case, a seller
may fail to sell in a period with positive probability because there is lack of coordination
among the unrelated buyers. Thus, in any given period, there is a strictly positive fraction
of sellers in the market who are not related to any buyer. For such a seller, the tradeoﬀ
between the price p0 and the trading probability 1 − e−(q10+q00) is smooth. Competition
among such unrelated sellers implies that the price p0 gives a strictly positive surplus to a
buyer. This also implies that the price charged by a seller with a related buyer, p1,m u s t
give a strictly positive surplus to a buyer. For if it did not, the buyer related to the seller
would choose to visit an unrelated seller instead. I express this result as
pj <U+ V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1), j ∈ {0,1}.
3.1. Types of equilibria with priority
In this subsection I characterize individuals’ optimal choices in more detail and narrow
down the set of equilibria. The following lemma is proven in Appendix B:
13Lemma 3.1. An equilibrium with priority satisﬁes: (i) θ11 =0=θ10,a n ds oθ1s =1 ;( i i )
θ00 > 0; (iii) if θ01 > 0,t h e nv1s >v 00 = v10;( i v )i fθ01 =0 ,t h e nv1s = v00.
The result θ11 = 0 in (i) of Lemma 3.1 says that a buyer with a related seller does not
visit a seller whose related buyer is someone else. Relative to visiting such a seller, the
buyer can get a strictly higher payoﬀ from visiting his related seller, since the two sellers
post the same price and the buyer gets a good with probability one from the related seller.
The result θ10 = 0 says that it is a dominant strategy for a buyer with a related seller
not to visit a seller who does not have a related buyer; that is, the buyer only visits his
related seller. To explain this result, let me refer to the particular buyer as buyer B and
the seller related to him as seller A.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the case where other buyers do not
visit seller A. For seller A to get a positive (expected) payoﬀ in this case, the seller must
attract buyer B with positive probability. If this probability were strictly less than one,
seller A could increase the visiting probability to one by cutting the price only slightly,
which would increase the seller’s expected payoﬀ by a discrete amount. Next, consider the
case where other buyers visit seller A with positive probability. In this case, if seller A
cuts the price slightly to induce buyer B to visit with probability one, it will generate a
discrete reduction in the probability that an unrelated visitor is chosen, which may drive
unrelated visitors away. To explain the result θ1s = 1 in this case, suppose that buyer B
visits another seller, say, seller C. Because buyer B is unrelated to seller C,h i sp a y o ﬀ from
the visit will be the same as the payoﬀ to a buyer without a related seller who visits seller
C. Because such unrelated buyers visit seller A with positive probability in the case in
discussion, their payoﬀ from visiting seller A must be at least as large as the payoﬀ from
visiting seller C. This implies that buyer B’s payoﬀ from visiting seller C cannot be higher
than the payoﬀ from visiting the related seller A without being given priority. Because
buyer B does have priority from seller A, he must be strictly better oﬀ visiting seller A
than visiting any other seller.
The result (ii) says that a buyer without a related seller visits a seller without a related
buyer with positive probability. This result is easy to understand: Since a seller without a
related buyer does not discriminate the visitors, he can always attract the buyers without
related sellers. The result (iii) says that if unrelated buyers visit the sellers with related
buyers with positive probability, that the equilibrium payoﬀ t oar e l a t e db u y e rm u s tb e
14strictly higher than the payoﬀ to an unrelated buyer. This result is explained as part of
the explanation for (i) above. Finally, the result (iv) says that if unrelated buyers only
visit unrelated sellers, then the two types of buyers must have the same payoﬀ in the
equilibrium. This is because in the case where a related seller’s only potential buyer is the
related buyer, a price increase does not generate crowding-out among the seller’s potential
visitors. In this case, the related seller can increase the payoﬀ by raising price until the
related buyer just slightly prefers visiting the seller.
With Lemma 3.1, an equilibrium must be one of the two types:
(i) Partial mixing: An active buyer with a related seller only visits that seller, and an
active buyer without a related seller mixes between the two types of sellers. In this case,
q01 > 0, q00 > 0, θ1s =1 ,a n dq10 = q11 =0 . T h i sc a s eh a sv1s >v 01 = v00 = v10 and,
hence, V1(ρ) >V 0(ρ). For partial mixing to be an equilibrium, it should not be proﬁtable
f o rat y p e - 1s e l l e rt or a i s ep1 to drive away type-0 buyers.
(ii) Complete separation: An active buyer with a related seller only visits his related seller,
a n da na c t i v eb u y e rw i t h o u tar e l a t e ds e l l e ro n l y visits the sellers without related buyers. In
this case, q01 =0 ,q00 > 0, θ1s =1 ,a n dq10 = q11 =0 .T h i sc a s eh a sv1s = v00 = v10 ≥ v01
and, hence, V1(ρ)=V0(ρ). For complete separation to be an equilibrium, it should not be
proﬁtable for a type-1 seller to reduce p1 to attract type-0 buyers.
In both cases, the equilibrium satisﬁes V a
1 (ρ)=m a x p v1s(ρ,p)a n dV a
0 (ρ)=m a x p v00(ρ,p).
Also, because q10 = q11 = 0, I shorten the notation q00 as q0,a n dq01 as q1.
Ie x a m i n eﬁrst the possibility of an equilibrium with partial mixing. For a seller without
a related buyer, the problem in (2.11) with partial mixing can be rewritten as
(1 + r)J0(ρ)= J0(ρ+1)+m a x
(p0,q0)
(1 − e−q0)[p0 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)]
s.t. 1−e−q0
q0 [U − p0 + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1)] = V a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1).
(3.1)
Here I have expressed the dependence of the queue length q0 on the price p0 explicitly
as a constraint and added q0 to the list of choices accordingly. The constraint is a form
of (2.9) with q0 > 0, which requires that the expected surplus that a type-0 buyer gets
from the seller should be equal to the buyer’s expected surplus in the market.6 The seller
6The actual form of the constraint is that the expected surplus to the buyer should be at least as large
as the buyer’s surplus in the market. But it is never possible in an equilibrium for a seller to give a buyer
more than the market surplus.
15takes future value functions, (V0,V 1,Va
0 ,J 0,J 1)(ρ+1), as given. The ﬁrst-order condition,
the constraint and the Bellman equation in (3.1) imply:
V a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1)=e−q0∆(ρ+1),
p0 = U + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1) −
q0
1−e−q0[V a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1)],
(3.2)
(1 + r)J0(ρ) − J0(ρ+1)=
h




where ∆ is the total surplus of the match deﬁned as
∆(ρ+1) ≡ U − c + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1)+J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1). (3.4)
These results have two noteworthy features, although they are standard in models
of directed search. First, an individual’s trading probability (i.e., matching rate) and the
share of the match surplus are endogenous and are functions of only the queue length q0.A
buyer’s probability of trade when visiting an unrelated seller is 1−e−q0
q0 ,w h i c hi sad e c r e a s i n g
function of q0. When the buyer gets a trade, the buyer’s surplus is U+V1(ρ+1)−V0(ρ+1)−p0.
As implied by the two equations in (3.2), the buyer’s surplus is a share
q0
eq0−1 of the match
surplus ∆. This share depends only on q0 and is a decreasing function of q0.T h u s , a
buyer’s share of the match surplus has a one-to-one positive relation to the buyer’s trading
probability. Second, an individual is compensated with an ex ante surplus according to
the individual’s social marginal contribution to the match. For example, a buyer’s ex ante
surplus from visiting an unrelated seller, V a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1), is equal to e−q0∆.T os e ew h y
t h i si se q u a lt ot h eb u y e r ’ ss o c i a lm a r g i n a lc ontribution, suppose that an additional buyer
joins the matching process with unrelated sellers. Because this buyer contributes to the
match only if an unrelated seller fails to get a match, which occurs with probability e−q0,
the buyer’s social marginal contribution is precisely e−q0∆. Similarly, an unrelated seller’s
social marginal contribution is equal to the expected surplus the seller creates, (1−e−q0)∆,
minus the expected surplus the seller crowds out, q0e−q0∆, as shown by (3.3).
With partial mixing, a type-1 seller’s decision problem in (2.12) can be written as
(1 + r)J1(ρ)=J0(ρ+1)+m a x
(p1,q1)
h
1 − (1 − λ)e
−q1
i






[U − p1 + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1)] = V
a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1), (3.6)
16h
1 − (1 − λ)e
−q1
i
[p1 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] ≥ λ[¯ p − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)],
(3.7)
where
¯ p = U + V1(ρ+1) − V
a
0 (ρ). (3.8)
As a form of (2.8) with q1 > 0, (3.6) requires that the expected surplus to a buyer who
does not have a related seller from visiting the type-1 seller should be equal to the buyer’s
surplus in the market. Note that this constraint implies U − p1 + V1(ρ+1) >Va
0 (ρ). That
is, if p1 satisﬁes (3.6), then a buyer gets a strictly higher payoﬀ from visiting the related
seller than from visiting any other seller. The second constraint, (3.7), requires that the
seller should not gain from deviating to a price that attracts only the related buyer. To see
this, note that ¯ p satisﬁes v1s(ρ, ¯ p)=V a
0 (ρ). That is, ¯ p is the highest price that the type-1
seller can charge and still attract the related buyer to visit him. By posting ¯ p − ε,w h e r e
ε>0i ss u ﬃciently small, the seller can attract the related buyer with certainty, provided
that the related buyer is active in the period. Also, the price ¯ p − ε does not attract any
type-0 buyer, because the expected value to an unrelated buyer from visiting the seller is
strictly less than the value V a
0 (ρ) that the buyer can get elsewhere. Thus, to the type-1
seller, posting ¯ p yields the expected surplus λ[¯ p − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)]. Constraint (3.7)
requires this expected surplus from the deviation not to exceed that from posting p1 to
attract both the related buyer and the buyers who have no related sellers.7
If (3.7) is binding, then the type-1 seller can gain by deviating to ¯ p that attracts only
the related buyer. In this case, an equilibrium with partial mixing does not exist. Thus,
to characterize an equilibrium with partial mixing, I omit (3.7) for the moment and check
later whether it is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst-order condition of the problem in (3.5) yields:
V
a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1)=
(1 − λ)2(1 − e−q1)2e−q1∆(ρ+1)
(1 − λ)[1− e−q1]
2 + λ[1 − (1 + q1)e−q1]
, (3.9)
where ∆ is deﬁned in (3.4), and (3.5) yields:
(1 + r)J1(ρ) − J0(ρ+1)=
[1 − (1 + q1)e−q1][1− (1 − λ)e−q1]
2 ∆(ρ+1)
(1 − λ)[1− e−q1]
2 + λ[1 − (1 + q1)e−q1]
. (3.10)
7In technical terms, a related seller’s payoﬀ function has a discrete jump at q1 = 0. Constraint (3.7)
ensures that the maximum payoﬀ that a related seller obtains with q1 > 0 is greater than or equal to the
payoﬀ at this point of jump.
17Similar to the case with a type-0 seller, the expressions in (3.9) and (3.10) show that an
individual’s share of the surplus of a match with a type-1 seller is a function of the queue
length of buyers for such a seller. However, because a type-1 seller gives priority to the
related buyer, this function is more complicated than the ones in (3.2) and (3.3).
The two expressions for [V a
0 (ρ) − V0(ρ+1)] in (3.2) and (3.9) must be consistent with
each other, and so the following relation holds between q0 and q1:












It can be veriﬁed that h(q) is an increasing function for all q>0.
Now I can establish the following lemma (see Appendix B for a proof):
Lemma 3.2. An equilibrium with partial mixing does not exist.
The reason why an equilibrium with partial mixing does not exist lies in its requirement
that a type-0 buyer should be indiﬀerent between visiting a type-0 seller and a type-1 seller.
When visiting a type-0 seller, a type-0 buyer has the same chance of being chosen to trade
with as any other visitor to the seller. In contrast, when visiting a type-1 seller, a type-0
buyer has a chance of being chosen to trade with only when the seller’s related buyer does
not show up. In the presence of this low priority, a type-0 buyer is willing to visit a type-1
seller only when either the queue length of buyers for a type-1 seller or the price posted
by a type-1 seller is suﬃciently lower than that at a type-0 seller. In either case, a type-1
seller’s expected surplus is lower than a type-0 seller’s, and so J1 <J 0.T h a ti s ,at y p e - 1
seller would rather increase the price to ¯ p to attract only the related buyer. This destroys
the equilibrium with partial mixing.
3.2. The equilibrium with complete separation
The analysis so far has established that the only possible equilibrium with priority is
the equilibrium with complete separation. With complete separation, a type-0 seller’s
maximization problem is still (3.1) and the optimality conditions are still given by (3.2)
and (3.3). In contrast, a type-1 seller now attracts only the related buyer (since q1 =0 )
and the price ¯ p given by (3.8) is the best for doing so. Because ¯ p does not attract any
18type-0 buyer to visit the seller, a type-1 seller’s value function is now given by
(1 + r)J1(ρ)=J0(ρ+1)+λ[¯ p − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)]. (3.12)
For complete separation to be an equilibrium, a type-1 seller should not gain from deviating
to a price that attracts the buyers who do not have related sellers. Among all prices that
attract both types of buyers, the best price p1 and the implied queue length q1 solve the
maximization problem in (3.5) subject to the constraint (3.6). This pair (p1,q 1)s a t i s ﬁes
(3.6) and (3.9). Let me denote the values of such (p1,q 1)a s( ˜ p1, ˜ q1). Because ˜ q1 satisﬁes
(3.9), the consistency between (3.9) and (3.2) implies q0 = h(˜ q1), where h is deﬁned in
(3.11). The price ˜ p1 can be retrieved from (3.6). Let me express this deviation as
˜ q1 = h
−1(q0), ˜ p1 = U + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1) −
˜ q1[V a
0 − V0]
(1 − e−˜ q1)(1 − λ)
. (3.13)
With this deviation, the type-1 seller sells the good with probability [1−(1−λ)e−˜ q1], and
the resulted surplus of trade to the seller is [˜ p1−c+J1(ρ+1) −J0(ρ+1)]. Thus, the deviation
is not proﬁtable for the type-1 seller if and only if
h
1 − (1 − λ)e
−˜ q1
i
[˜ p1 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] ≤ λ[¯ p − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)].
(3.14)
An equilibrium with complete separation must also satisfy J1(ρ) ≥ J0(ρ) in order to
ensure that it is optimal for a type-1 seller to give priority to the related buyer. Moreover,
q0 and ρ need to be determined and veriﬁed to satisfy q0 > 0a n dρ ∈ (0,min{1,b}). With
complete separation, the adding-up constraint (2.14) yields:
q0 = H(ρ) ≡ λ(b − ρ)/(1 − ρ). (3.15)
Then, the law of motion of ρ given in (2.15) becomes:






Note that (3.15) and (3.16) are independent of other variables than (ρ,q0). Thus, the
steady state and the dynamics of (ρ,q0) can be solved from these two equations without
the help of any other equilibrium relations.
Denote the steady state of the equilibrium by adding the superscript ∗ to the variables.
I prove the following proposition in Appendix C:
19Proposition 3.3. (i) The fraction of related sellers in the market has a unique steady
state ρ∗, which is locally stable. The steady state and the dynamics of (ρ,q0) depend only







db > 0,a n d
dρ∗
dλ > 0.
(ii) There exists B(λ) > 0,d e ﬁned in Appendix C, such that the steady state with complete
separation exists if and only if b ≤ B(λ). Under this condition, the steady state is unique.
B(λ) is independent of other parameters such as (c,U).
(iii) For ρ close to ρ∗, ∆(ρ) > 0, and the dynamic equilibrium satisﬁes:
p0 = U −
q0e−q0
1 − e−q0∆(ρ+1), (3.17)
p1 =¯ p = U − e


















where q0 = H(ρ) and ρ+1 = G(ρ) are given by (3.15) and (3.16).
The fraction of related sellers in the market has a unique steady state which is locally
stable. To understand this result, it is useful to consider the special case b = 1, i.e., the
case where the number of buyers is equal to the number of sellers. In this case, q0 = λ
(see (3.15)), and G(ρ)i sl i n e a ri nρ with a slope (λ − 1+e−λ) ∈ (0,1). In this case, the
ﬂow of related sellers who lose relationships due to the absence of related buyers from the
market is (1 − λ)ρ,a n dt h eﬂow of unrelated sellers who gain relationships through trade
is (1 − ρ)(1 − e−λ). If ρ>ρ ∗,t h eﬂow of related sellers who lose relationships is greater,
and the ﬂow of unrelated sellers who acquire relationships is smaller, than the ﬂow in the
steady state. Because there is a positive net ﬂow of sellers out of relationships, the fraction
of related sellers falls toward the steady state. On the other hand, if ρ<ρ ∗,t h eﬂow
of related sellers who lose relationships is smaller, and the ﬂow of unrelated sellers who
acquire relationships is greater, than the ﬂow in the steady state. The fraction of related
sellers increases toward the steady state. Similar stabilizing forces are at play when b 6=1 ,
although the dependence of q0 on ρ adds to the dynamics.
20It is notable that ρ and q0 depend only on (λ,b) and not on other parameters such
as (c,U). Recall that the extensive margin of the demand is bλ. To explain why ρ and
q0 depend on the extensive margin of the demand but not on the intensive margin of the
market, note that ρ and q0 in the equilibrium are determined by the requirements on the
matching rates and not by the size of the match surplus. Speciﬁcally, given the parameters
(λ,b) and the composition of sellers, ρ,t h eq u e u el e n g t hq0 is uniquely pinned down by
the requirement that a buyer’s visiting probabilities across the sellers should add up to
one. Conversely, given (λ,b)a n dq0, each seller’s matching rate is uniquely determined, as
explained above. These matching rates in turn determine the transition of sellers between
the two types and, hence, the dynamics of the composition of sellers, ρ.T h e s et w or e l a t i o n s
are given above as q0 = H(ρ)a n dρ+1 = G(ρ), respectively. Because the only parameters
in these relations are (λ,b), the solutions for (ρ,q0) to these relations depend only on (λ,b)
and not on other parameters such as the cost c and the utility level U.8
It is intuitive that the fraction of related sellers in the steady state increases in the two
dimensions of the extensive margin of the demand, b and λ.A h i g h e r b or λ leads to a
larger number of trades in each period. Because a trade keeps a related seller related to
a buyer and turns an unrelated seller into a related one, the increase in the number of
trades increases the fraction of sellers who are related to some buyers in the equilibrium.
It is also intuitive that a higher buyer/seller ratio increases the queue length of buyers for
an unrelated seller in the steady state, q∗
0, because the larger number of buyers must be
eventually allocated to the sellers. However, it is ambiguous whether a higher λ increases
q∗
0. On the one hand, a higher λ increases the demand per seller, which has a positive eﬀect
on q∗
0. On the other hand, since sellers give priority to related buyers, a higher λ can lead
to proportionally more buyers visiting related sellers, which reduces the queue length of
buyers for each unrelated seller. The overall eﬀect of λ on q∗
0 depends on the values of λ
and b (see subsection 4.2.3 for an example).
The steady state with complete separation exists if and only if the buyer/seller ratio
is not too high, i.e., if and only if b ≤ B(λ). When the number of buyers for each seller
is small, it is diﬃcult for a seller to obtain a trade. Because increasing the probability
of trade is relatively important for a seller in this case, it is optimal for a seller to give
8If there is free entry of sellers, then b is determined endogenously. In this case, ρ and q0 depend on
(c,U) through b. See section 5.
21priority to his related buyer so as to guarantee a trade when the buyer is active. Moreover,
when the buyer/seller ratio is low, the price charged by a seller without a related buyer
is likely to be low. Competing against such sellers for unrelated buyers is not optimal
for a seller with a related buyer, because it requires the seller to cut price suﬃciently to
compensate unrelated buyers for their low priority. Thus, the equilibrium in this case has
complete separation between related and unrelated individuals. On the other hand, if the
buyer/seller ratio is high, getting a buyer is relatively easy for a seller, in which case it is
optimal for a seller to treat all buyers equally.
The critical level B depends only on λ and not on other parameters such as the cost c
and the utility U. To see why, note that an individual seller’s decisions on whether or not
to give priority to the related buyer and whether to attract one type or two types of buyers
change the seller’s expected share of the match surplus but not the size of the surplus
(which is given as ∆). As explained above, a seller’s expected share of the match surplus
is determined by the endogenous matching rate which, in turn, is only a function of the
queue length q0 and the parameters (λ,b). Because the queue length q0 depends only on
(λ,b), so does a seller’s expected surplus share. Other parameters, such as (c,U), aﬀect the
size of the match surplus but do not aﬀect how the surplus is shared between the two sides.
Diﬀerent strategies of a seller lead to diﬀerent expected shares of the match surplus to the
seller, all of which are only functions of (λ,b). The seller chooses the strategy that yields
the highest share. Thus, the condition needed for the strategy of complete separation to










Figure 1. The critical level B(λ) of the buyer/seller ratio
22An increase in λ has two eﬀects on the critical level B, similar to the two eﬀects of λ
on q0.O n e e ﬀect is the general eﬀect of a higher λ on the demand. This eﬀect makes a
relationship less valuable, reduces B and makes the steady state with complete separation
less likely to exist. The other eﬀect is that a higher λ tilts the demand toward related
sellers because of the priority. This eﬀect makes a relationship more valuable, increases
B and makes the steady state with complete separation more likely to exist. The overall
eﬀect of λ on B is diﬃcult to determine analytically, despite that the B(λ)i n v o l v e sn o
other parameter. It is straightforward to compute B(λ) numerically, which is depicted in
Figure 1. It is clear that B(λ) > 1a n dB0(λ) < 0f o ra l lλ ∈ (0,1). Thus, a higher λ makes
the equilibrium with complete separation less likely to exist for any given b.
3.3. Relationship, the regular price and sales
In any period, related sellers post price p1 =¯ p and unrelated sellers post p0 < ¯ p (see
(3.18)). Each price follows dynamics toward its own steady-state level as the fraction of
related sellers adjusts to the steady state. For reasons that will become clear below, let me
interpret p1 as the regular price and p0 as the sale price. A seller posts the regular price
as long as he has a related buyer. Once a seller loses the relationship, he holds a sale at
price p0 until he has a trade after which he switches back to the regular price.
There are two noteworthy features of such sales. First, the primary consideration for
holding a sale is intertemporal. By holding a sale, a seller intends to attract buyers and
build a relationship, but the relationship will be paid oﬀ only in the future through a higher
(regular) price. Second, the sale price can be even below the marginal cost of the good.
That is, it is possible that p0 <c ,w h i c hc a nb ev e r i ﬁed with the formula of p0 in (3.17).
To explain why this possibility exists, note that the surplus of a trade to a seller without
ar e l a t e db u y e ri s[ p0 − c + J1 − J0]. Even if p0 <c , the surplus can still be positive if the
gain in the future through the relationship, as measured by (J1 − J0), is large enough to
outweigh the temporary loss (p0 − c). In contrast, the regular price p1 is always strictly
higher than the marginal cost (see (3.18)). This contrast between the two prices and the
intertemporal motivation for posting the lower price p0 justify the interpretation of p0 as
the sale price and p1 as the regular price.
The equilibrium has precise predictions on the frequency, the duration and the price
discount of sales. To calculate the frequency of trades at the sale price, note that the
23number of trades at p1 is Mρλ and the number of trades at p0 is M(1 − ρ)(1 − e−q0).
Denote the frequency of trades at the sale price as dprob. Then,
dprob =
(1 − ρ)(1 − e−q0)
ρλ +( 1− ρ)(1 − e−q0)
. (3.21)
When ρ = ρ∗,w h e r eρ∗ is the steady state of (3.16), it is easy to verify that dprob∗ =
1 − λ. The frequency of trades at the sale price in the steady state depends on λ but
not on (b,c,U). This result is intuitive: because the motive for holding a sale is to gain
a relationship with a buyer, how often a seller holds sales should depend only on how
frequently the seller loses a relationship, which is 1 − λ.
Let dlength denote the expected duration of a sale. If a seller holds a sale in the current
period, the sale will continue next period if and only if the seller fails to trade in the current
period, which occurs with probability e−q0.T h u s ,dlength =1+e−q0 × dlength,a n ds o
dlength =
1
1 − e−q0. (3.22)
As explained for Proposition 3.3, q0 depends only on the extensive margin of the demand,
(λ,b). Thus, the duration of a sale depends only on (λ,b)a n dn o to nt h ei n t e n s i v em a r g i no f
the market. Moreover, the two dimensions of the extensive margin can aﬀect the duration
of a sale diﬀerently. Because a higher b increases q0, the duration of a sale always falls when
the buyer/seller ratio increases. In contrast, λ aﬀects the duration of a sale ambiguously
because it aﬀects q0 ambiguously. The duration decreases in λ if q0 increases in λ,a n dt h e
duration increases in λ if q0 decreases in λ.












In contrast to the frequency and duration of a sale, the price discount depends on the
factors on the intensive margin of the market, such as (c,U), as well as the factors on the
extensive margin, (λ,b). It depends (λ,b) through (q0,∆)a n do n( c,U) through U/∆.F o r








Because the regular price is strictly higher than the cost (see (3.18)), the regular price
always implies a positive markup. In contrast, since it is possible to have p0 <c ,t h es a l e
24price can imply a markdown instead of a markup. Weighting each markup by the frequency
of trades occurring at the associated price, I obtain the average markup as
markavg = dprob × markup0+( 1− dprob) × markup1. (3.25)
Similarly, I can calculate the average price in the equilibrium.
4. Calibration, Comparative Statics and Dynamics
In this section I calibrate the steady state of the model to the data, compute the responses
of the steady state to changes in (c,b,λ), and then examine the dynamics.
4.1. Calibration
The model has ﬁve parameters, (r,U,c,b,λ). Table 1 lists the targets used to identify these
parameters and the identiﬁed values. The length of a period is chosen to be one week. By
setting the annual discount rate to 4%, I deter m i n et h ev a l u eo ft h ew e e k l yd i s c o u n tr a t e
through (1 + r)52 =1 .04. The utility of consuming a good is normalized to one. I set the
fraction of price quotes (not trades) at p∗
0 in the steady state to 1−ρ∗ =0 .15, which solves
ρ∗. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) report that roughly 11% of all price quotes are sale prices
in the microdata on the U.S. monthly CPI in 1988-2004 collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Because sales tend to be short-lived, the monthly data are likely to under-report
the frequency of sales, and so I use a larger number for the frequency of sales.9
Table 1. Parameters and calibration targets
parameter value target
r:d i s c o u n tr a t e 7.545 × 10−4 annual discount rate = 0.04
U: utility level 1 normalization
λ:a c t i v ep r o b . 0.956 frequency of sale price quotes = 0.15
b: buyer/seller ratio 0.895 average duration of a sale = 4 weeks
c: marginal cost 0.311 percentage price discount of a sale = 0.28
Next, I set the duration of a sale in the steady state to 4 weeks. Using the microdata
on U.S. CPI in 1988-2004, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that the fraction of sales
9To get a sense of the eﬀect of time aggregation, note that Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) report that
15% of all (monthly) price quotes for food items are sales. With daily data collected on a speciﬁcf o o d
item (bottled ketchup), Pesendorfer (2002) reports that 23% of prices fall in the range $0.99 - $1.19, while
60% of all daily prices fall in the range $1.39 - $1.49. If the ﬁrst range is regarded as the range of sale
prices, then sale prices are at least 23% of all price quotes.
25that last just one month ranges between 35% and 60% in the four major groups (processed
food, unprocessed food, household furnishings, and apparel), and the average length of
sales is 1.8-2.3 months. Since these major groups tend to be the ones with more frequent
and longer sales than other goods, and since sales shorter than one month are likely to be
under-sampled in the monthly data, the length of 4 weeks is a reasonable target for the
duration of a sale.10 Because the length of a sale in the model is given by (3.22), this target
determines q∗
0.N o wt h a tρ∗ and q∗
0 are solved, I can retrieve λ and b from the steady-state
version of (3.15) and (3.16), which are (C.1) and (C.2) in Appendix C. Finally, I match
t h ep r i c ed i s c o u n to fas a l ei nt h es t e a d ys t a t et ot h et a r g e t2 8 % .T h es a l ep r i c ec h a n g e
is 25.1% on average in the U.S. CPI microdata (see Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008) and, in
eleven major groups of goods, it is 29.5% (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). I take a
number between these two as the target. Since the price discount of a sale in the model is
given by (3.23), this target determines c.
Note that b is noticeably less than one, and so the condition b ≤ B(λ) under which
the steady state with complete separation exists is satisﬁed. Also, since λ is the fraction
of trades (rather than price quotes) that occur at the price p∗
1, an overwhelming majority
of trades (about 95.6%) occur at p∗
1 in steady state, which lends further support for the
interpretation of p1 as the regular price. Moreover, the average price in the steady state is
0.346 and the average markup in the steady state is markavg∗ =0 .113.
4.2. Comparative statics
Using the calibrated model, I conduct comparative statics with respect to changes in
(c,b,λ). The superscript ∗ on steady-state variables is suppressed in this subsection.
4.2.1. Steady-state responses to changes in the cost
The ﬁrst experiment is to compute the responses of the steady state to changes in the
marginal cost of a good. The value of c identiﬁed above is 0.311. I vary c from 0.1t o0 .9.
10Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) report that the duration of a temporary price (such as a sale price) is
1/0.53 months in the BLS data and 1/0.46 weeks in scanner data collected from a large supermarket chain.
The diﬀerence between these two numbers reﬂects not only the fact that the BLS data covers more goods
and services than scanner data does, but also the fact that the BLS data samples prices monthly while
scanner data samples weekly. The duration of 4 weeks that I choose is close to the average of the two
numbers in the two datasets.
26Most variables respond to the cost in a predictable way. For example, as the cost increases,
both the regular price p1 and the sale price p0 increase. The values to a buyer and a seller
fall, regardless of whether the individual is related in the market. Because q0 and ρ are
independent of c, as established in Proposition 3.3, the matching rates, the frequency of











Figure 2. Responses of markups to the marginal cost c
The responses of the markups to the marginal cost are noteworthy. In Figure 2, I depict
steady-state markups as functions of c. The markup implied by the sale price, markup0,
is negative for all values of c,a n ds ot h es a l ep r i c ei sam a r k d o w no nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t .
The occurrence of this markdown is intuitive. Because the buyer/seller ratio is noticeably
less than one (b =0 .895), a relationship is important for a seller. By oﬀering a markdown,
a seller can attract a buyer to visit and the resulting relationship enables the seller to sell
a good with a higher probability in the future. The current lose from the the markdown
is compensated with a markup at the regular price in the future. At the baseline value of
t h ec o s t ,t h em a r k d o w ni m p l i e db yt h es a l ep r i c ei smarkup0=−0.189 and the markup
implied by the regular price is markup1=0 .127. The average markup is positive and close
to the markup implied by the regular price, because a majority (95.6%) of trades take
place at the regular price. The occurrence of markdowns is consistent with the ﬁnding by
Dutta et al. (2002) using scanner data from a supermarket chain. Note that most of the
IO models of sales cited in the introduction do not generate markdowns.
The markdown and the markup are large when the cost is very low and their absolute
values decrease precipitously when the cost increases. For example, when the cost is
27c =0 .1, the markdown is −0.765, the markup is 0.513 and the average markup is 0.457,
but when the cost increases to c =0 .5, the markdown is −0.085, the markup is 0.057 and
the average markup is 0.051. When the cost is very low, the markdown and the markup
are large because the gain to a seller from making a buyer related to him is large. As this
gain decreases in the cost, the room for markups is reduced, and so is the need to use large
markdowns to attract a buyer to build a relationship.
These responses of the markups to the cost have useful implications for constructing
macro models. First, if customer relationships are important in the retail market, then
the models with monopolistic competition popularly used in macro are not suitable for
capturing the responses of prices to cost shocks. Those models typically have constant
markups. Second, the percentage change in the regular price in response to the cost
change is less than that in the sale price. In this sense, the regular price is relatively more
stable than the sale price. The source of this diﬀerence is that a related seller’s trading
probability is higher than an unrelated seller’s, and so the same change in the price amounts
to a larger change in expected proﬁt for a related seller than for an unrelated seller. To
cover the increase in the cost, a smaller change in the regular price is needed than in the
sale price. Third, since the sale price responds to the cost diﬀerently from the response of
the regular price, it has a life of its own. Speciﬁcally, after a cost shock, the new sale price
diﬀers from the previous sale price and it is not a ﬁxed fraction of the new regular price. A
model that ignores or simply ﬁlters out sales prices distorts the responses of prices to cost
shocks. Finally, across goods that diﬀer in the cost and utility, the higher the diﬀerence
(U − c), the larger the diﬀerence between the regular price and the sale price. That is,
goods with a higher proﬁt margin have a higher variability in prices.
4.2.2. Steady-state responses to changes in the buyer/seller ratio
The second experiment is to change the extensive margin of the demand by changing the
buyer/seller ratio b. As demonstrated analytically in Proposition 3.3, an increase in b
increases the queue length of buyers for each unrelated seller, q0, and increases the fraction
of sellers who have related buyers, ρ. As a result, the duration of a sale decreases. For b
ranging from 0.45 to 1.1, Figure 3.1 depicts steady-state markups and Figure 3.2 depicts
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Figure 3.2. Sale duration and discount as functions of b
There are a number of notable features. First, the markdown feature in Figure 1
extends from the baseline value of b to all values of b ≤ 0.984. The absolute value of the
markdown reaches the maximum at b =0 .92. When b continues to increase above 0.92,
a seller’s incentive to use markdowns to attract buyers becomes increasingly weak, and so
the markup implied by the sale price eventually becomes positive. Second, the markup
implied by the regular price is positive and increases in b for all values of b.T o g e t h e r
with the behavior of the markup implied by the sale price, this implies that the percentage
price discount of a sale, dsize, has a hump-shaped dependence on b, as depicted in Figure
3.2. This price discount increases when b increases from low values, reaches the maximum
11All these values of b satisfy the condition b ≤ B(λ) required for the steady state with complete
separation to exist.
29around b =0 .98 and then starts to fall as b continues to increase. Third, in contrast to
the non-monotonic dependence of the markdown and the price discount of a sale on b,t h e
duration of the discount, dlength, monotonically decreases in b, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
This is because the duration of the discount is a decreasing function of the queue length
of buyers for each unrelated seller and, as shown in Proposition 3.3, this queue length
increases monotonically with the buyer/seller ratio.
Note that reductions in b generate large, non-linear increases in the duration of a sale.
For example, when b decreases from the baseline value 0.895 to 0.7 and then to 0.5, the
duration of a sale increases from 4 weeks to 11.3w e e k sa n dt h e nt o2 4 .8 weeks. In contrast
to the non-monotonic responses of prices and the price discount, this monotonic increase
in the duration of a sale with the reduction of the buyer/seller ratio is a more reliable
indicator of the change in the market condition.
4.2.3. Steady-state responses to changes in λ
The third experiment is to change the probability that a buyer is active in a period, λ.
Although λ aﬀects the extensive margin of the demand as does b,i ti sd i ﬀerent from b.
While b aﬀects the demand for related and unrelated sellers evenly, λ aﬀects the demand
unevenly. For λ ranging from 0.1t o0 .95, Figure 4.1 depicts the queue length of buyers per
unrelated seller, q0, and the duration of a sale in the steady state, while Figure 4.2 depicts
the markups in the steady state. The queue length q0 depends on λ non-monotonically: it
increases in λ when λ increases from low values, reaches the maximum around λ =0 .78
a n dt h e nd e c r e a s e sa sλ increases further. This means that at low values of λ, the general
eﬀect of a higher λ in increasing the demand dominates but at high values of λ,t h ee ﬀect
of a higher λ in shifting the demand to related sellers dominates. Because the duration
of a sale is a decreasing function of q0, the hump-shaped response of q0 to λ implies that
the duration of a sale has a U-shaped dependence on λ. That is, the duration of a sale is
higher at both high and low values of λ than at intermediate values of λ.
The markups also depend on λ non-monotonically. At low values of λ,t h em a r k u p s
implied by the regular price and the sale price are both positive, and both increase in
λ. The markup implied by the sale price reaches the maximum around λ =0 .45, after
which it falls and eventually becomes negative. The markup implied by the regular price
continues to increase until λ =0 .66, after which it also starts to fall but stays positive.
30As a result, the price discount of a sale (not depicted) has hump-shaped dependence on
λ. These responses of the two markups to λ reﬂect the fact that the gain to a seller from
building a relationship with a buyer is larger at intermediate values of λ than at both high
and low values of λ.A tl o wv a l u e so fλ, the return to a seller from a relationship is low
because the related buyer is unlikely to make a purchase in the future. At high values of
λ, there is not much need to build a relationship because a buyer is readily available. At
intermediate values of λ, there is a sizable beneﬁt of giving priority to the related buyer
and charging a high regular price later. Reﬂecting this non-monotonic dependence of the
beneﬁt of a relationship, a seller’s value function (not depicted here) has hump-shaped
dependence on λ and reaches the maximum around λ =0 .8, although a buyer’s value
monotonically increases in λ.
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Figure 4.1. Queue length of buyers for an unrelated













Figure 4.2. Markups as functions of λ
It is remarkable that the average markup can fall with λ when λ is large enough. Be-
31cause λ is a dimension of the extensive margin of the demand, this result indicates that it
is possible for prices to fall when the demand increases. This result is not as perverse as it
seems. For example, Chevalier et al. (2003) ﬁnd that prices of particular items in a super-
market chain typically fall when the items experience peak seasonal demand. The current
model oﬀers customer relationship as an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. It
suggests that the phenomenon is more likely to arise when the peak demand comes from
a store’s regular customers than from general customers.
4.3. Dynamic responses of the equilibrium
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state with the baseline parameter values cali-
brated above. Then there is an unanticipated permanent change in one of the parameters.
I compute the dynamics of the equilibrium after this change. The main purpose of this
exercise is to check how the dynamics of the stock of customer relationships, ρ,a ﬀect
short-run responses of the equilibrium and, in particular, whether short-run responses are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the long-run responses documented in subsection 4.2. It is
straightforward to compute the dynamics of the equilibrium after a permanent change in
a parameter (see the description at the end of Appendix C).
The equilibrium responds to a change in the cost in the same way in the short run as
in the long run, provided that the economy is at the steady state before the cost changes.
The reason is that the stock of customer relationships, ρ, and the queue length of buyers
for an unrelated seller, q0, are independent of the cost. The dynamics of these two variables
are completely determined by (3.15) and (3.16), where the cost c does not appear. If the
economy is in the steady state before the cost changes, then ρ and q0 will remain in the
steady state. So will the frequency and the duration of a sale. As a result, the total surplus
of a match, whose dynamics obey (3.20), will have a one-time jump from the old to the
new steady state. Prices, markups, and price discounts will also have a one-time jump,
and so the dynamics of the equilibrium are completed in one period.
To economize on space, let me analyze the dynamics after a shock to b and omit the
analysis on a shock to λ. Consider a permanent increase of b f r o mt h eb a s e l i n ev a l u e
0.8 9 5t o0 .95. For convenience of graphing the dynamics, let the increase in b o c c u ra tt h e
beginning of period 2 instead of period 1. Figure 5.1 depicts the dynamics of the queue
length q0 and the fraction of related sellers ρ, while Figure 5.2 depicts the dynamics of the
32markups. As established in Proposition 3.3, the increase in b increases steady-state values
of q0 and b.N o t i c et h a tρ increases monotonically from the initial steady state to the new
steady state, but the queue length q0 overshoots the new steady state immediately after
the shock (in period 2) and then decreases toward the new steady state. Overshooting in
q0 occurs because ρ is ﬁxed in period 2 at the old steady-state level, which means that
each seller gets a higher expected number of buyers after the increase in b than in the new
steady state. Precisely, with b<1, the function q0 = H(ρ) given by (3.15) is a decreasing
function of ρ,a n ds oρ<ρ ∗ implies q0 >q ∗
0.O v e r s h o o t i n gi nq0 implies that the duration
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Figure 5.2. Dynamic responses of markups to b
33Similarly, because ρ is ﬁx e di np e r i o d2a tt h eo l ds t e a d ys t a t e ,t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
buyer/seller ratio increases a seller’s expected proﬁt by more in period 2 than in the new
steady state. Sellers are able to charge a higher price in period 2 than in the new steady
state. Thus, the markup implied by each price overshoots the new steady state, as depicted
in Figure 5.2. Notice that the transition is relatively short: the economy is very close to the
new steady state four weeks after the shock. Thus, the shock does not produce persistent
diﬀerences between short-run and long-run responses.
5. Free Entry of Sellers
In previous sections I have assumed that the buyer/seller ratio b is ﬁxed. In this section,
Ie n d o g e n i z eb by allowing free entry of sellers into the market. Let k be the cost of entry
and, to simplify various expressions, let it be measured at the end of the previous period.
If a seller pays the cost k to enter the market, the seller is unrelated to any buyer, and so
the seller’s value function is J0(ρ), also measured at the end of the previous period. Free
entry implies that the net value of an entry seller is zero, i.e., J0(ρ)=k. Let me focus on
the eﬀect of entry on the steady state. With J0(ρ) in (3.3) and ∆∗ in (C.11), the free-entry
condition implies the following equation in the steady state:
1+r − λ(1 − e−q∗
0)
1 − (1 + q∗
0)e−q∗





0 is solved from this equation, the steady-state version of (3.16) determines ρ∗ with
H(ρ∗)=q∗
0, and (3.15) solves for the steady-state value of the buyer/seller ratio, b∗.O t h e r
steady-state variables can be recovered accordingly.
The following proposition states the condition for the existence of a steady state with
endogenous b and the properties of this steady state (see Appendix D for a proof):
Proposition 5.1. (i) There exists K>0 such that a steady state with endogenous b and
complete separation exists if and only if k ≤ K, in which case the steady state is unique.
(ii) In the steady state, dq∗
0/dc > 0, dρ∗/dc > 0, db∗/dc > 0.
(iii) dp∗
0/dc > 0, dp∗
1/dc > 0, d(p∗
1 − p∗
0)/dc < 0,a n dd(p∗
1 − c)/dc < 0.
The existence of the steady state requires the entry cost not to be very high. If the entry
cost is very high, then the expected value for an unrelated seller must increase accordingly
34in order to cover the entry cost. This requires the matching rate for an unrelated seller to
increase and, hence, the queue length of buyers per unrelated seller to increase. Since it is
relatively easy to have a trade as an unrelated seller in this case, a related seller ﬁnds it
optimal to attract unrelated buyers or to give no priority to the related buyer.
An increase in the marginal cost of the good increases the queue length per unrelated
seller, q∗
0, the fraction of related sellers in the market, ρ∗, and the buyer/seller ratio, b∗.
These eﬀects are easy to explain. An increase in the marginal cost reduces ex post proﬁt.
Since the entry cost has not changed, the trading probability must increase for an unrelated
seller in order keep the seller’s expected proﬁt equal to the entry cost. This requires the
queue length for an unrelated seller to increase. As each unrelated seller succeeds in trading
more likely than before, the ﬂow of sellers from unrelated ones into related ones increases,
and so the fraction of related sellers in the steady state, ρ∗, increases. Also, for the queue
length of buyers per unrelated seller to increase, there must be fewer sellers than before;
that is, the buyer/seller ratio, b∗, increases. Note that because the increase in the cost
increases the queue length, it reduces the duration of a sale, in contrast to the constant
queue length when b is ﬁxed.
Part (iii) of Proposition 5.1 reveals that the increase in the cost increases the two prices
unevenly and it increases the prices not by the same amount as the increase in the cost
itself. First, the sale price increases with the cost by more than the regular price does. This
diﬀerence between the two prices’ responses to the cost is similar to that in subsection 4.2.1,
and it is reinforced here by the increase in the buyer/seller ratio induced by the increase
in the cost. As a result of this diﬀerence, the increase in the cost reduces the percentage of
the price discount. Second, the regular price increases by less than the increase in the cost,
again reﬂecting the feature that the regular price is relatively more stable with respect to
the change in the cost. This result implies that the markup implied by the regular price
falls as the cost increases. The response of the markup implied by the sale price to the
cost is ambiguous analytically.
On the quantitative side, I can calibrate the entry cost k so that the steady-state
buyer/seller ratio at the baseline value of c is equal to the one identiﬁed in Table 1. With
this value of k, the markup implied by the sale price is negative and increases with the cost.
More importantly, the responses of the two markups to the cost (not graphed here) are very
35close to the ones depicted in Figure 2. In particular, it is diﬃcult to discern the diﬀerence
between the responses of the markdown by the sale price in the case with an endogenous
b and the case with a ﬁxed b. The response of the markup by the regular price is slightly
ﬂatter in the case with an endogenous b t h a ni nt h ec a s ew i t haﬁxed b. Thus, endogenizing
b does not change the responses of prices to the cost by much. Instead, the main change
in the eﬀect is that an increase in the cost reduces the duration of a sale sizably when b is
endogenous, in contrast to the constant duration when b is ﬁxed. This contrast between
the two cases provides another illustration for the earlier statement that the duration of a
sale reﬂects the market conditions more accurately than prices or markups do.
The eﬀects of an increase in the entry cost are similar to an increase in the cost of a
good, and so they are omitted here. The eﬀects of an increase in the probability of a buyer
being active, λ,a r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent in the case with an endogenous b from those in the case
of a ﬁxed b. It is easy to verify from (5.1) that when b is endogenous, an increase in λ leads
to a reduction in q∗
0 rather than the non-monotonic response depicted in Figure 4.1. This
is because for most values of λ except high λ,a ni n c r e a s ei nλ increases the demand and
induces more sellers to enter the market, which drives down the queue length of buyers per
seller. As a result, the duration of a sale increases with λ. Moreover, when b is endogenous,
both the magnitude and the response of a markup to λ are diﬀerent from those depicted in
Figure 4.2 for the case with a ﬁxed b.W i t ha ne n d o g e n o u sb, the two markups are positive
when λ is low and they decrease with λ for all values of λ. The markup implied by the sale
price eventually becomes negative as λ becomes suﬃciently large. Thus, with free entry of
sellers, an increase in λ r e d u c e sp r i c e sf o ra l lv a l u e so fλ, not just for high values of λ.T h e
increasing part of the response of markups to λ in Figure 4.2 is reversed here by the eﬀect
of a falling buyer/seller ratio.
6. Conclusion
I construct a search model to formalize the intuitive idea that sellers hold sales to attract
buyers and build customer relationships. The market consists of a large number of buyers
and sellers. All sellers sell a homogeneous good and all buyers have the same publicly
known valuation of the good. Buyers know the terms of trade oﬀered by sellers before
c h o o s i n gw h i c hs e l l e rt ov i s i t . Ab u y e ri sr e l a t e dt oas e l l e ri ft h eb u y e rj u s tb o u g h ta
36good from the seller and the relationship is broken if the buyer fails to continue to buy
from the seller. Sellers are restricted to oﬀer the same price to all buyers, but they are
allowed to give priority to their related buyers. I prove that there is an equilibrium in
which a seller gives priority to the related buyer and a buyer makes repeat purchases from
the related seller. In the equilibrium, a seller who does not have a related buyer posts a
low (sale) price to attract the buyers who are unrelated to any seller and, once the seller
is related to a buyer after a trade, the seller will post a high (regular) price to sell only
to the related buyer. The fraction of related sellers is endogenous in the equilibrium. I
calibrate the steady state of the model to the data and ﬁnd that the sale price represents
a sizable markdown, and the regular price a sizable markup, on the marginal cost. With
the calibrated model, I examine comparative statics and dynamics of the equilibrium with
respect to changes in the cost of and the demand for the good.
Aside from formalizing a theory on customer relationships and sales, this model is
intended to be a step toward building a macro model in which sales are an important part
of price adjustments in aggregate ﬂuctuations. There is still some distance to go from the
current model to such a macro model. The model needs to incorporate money and add ﬁxed
costs of changing prices in order to make nominal prices sticky. However, the current model
holds some promises. In contrast to other models of sales, this model has many buyers
and sellers, it is dynamic and it endogenizes customer relationships. The calibration shows
that customer relationship can be an important driving force of price ﬂuctuations. It can
generate markdowns as well as markups and can explain some puzzling price behavior
in the data. Moreover, the regular price is less responsive to shocks than the sale price,
which is consistent with the microdata (Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, and Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2008). Finally, the model shows that the duration of a sale responds to shocks
more accurately than prices do. A macro model with sales should explicitly incorporate
the duration of a sale as part of price adjustments.12
12Recently, Guimaraes and Sheedy (2009) and Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) incorporate sales into a
macro model with sticky prices. Guimaraes and Sheedy (2009) assume that households are loyal to certain
brands exogenously. Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) assume that sale prices and regular prices are governed
by diﬀerent processes and diﬀerent menu costs.
37Appendix
A. Derivation of Trading Probabilities
I calculate the probability that a type-0 buyer B who visits a particular seller A of type-0
is chosen by seller A.S e l l e rA posts price p. Each active type-i buyer visits seller A with
probability θi0(ρ,p), where i ∈ {0,1}. The queue length of type-1 buyers visiting seller
A is q10(ρ,p)=λρMθ10(ρ,p), and the queue length of type-0 buyers visiting seller A is
q00(ρ,p)=λ(N −ρM)θ00(ρ,p). To simplify the notation below, I suppress the dependence
of θ10, θ00, q10 and q00 on (ρ,q).
Each buyer who has a related seller visits seller A with probability λθ10.B e c a u s e




n1 (1 − λθ10)
ρM−n1,w h e r eC
n1
ρM =( ρM)!/[(n1)!(ρM − n1)!]. In addition, each
type-0 buyer visits seller A with probability λθ00.B e c a u s e t h e r e a r e N − ρM − 1s u c h




n0 (1 − λθ00)
N−ρM−1−n0.I fs e l l e rA is visited by n1 type-1 buyers and
n0 type-0 buyers in addition to buyer B,t h e nb u y e rB will be chosen by seller A with
probability 1/(n1+n0+1). Considering all realizations of n1 and n0, I conclude that buyer








































n0 (1 − λθ00)
N−ρM−1−n0
i
=[ xλθ10 +1− λθ10]
ρM [xλθ00 +1− λθ00]
N−ρM−1 .
Note that g(x)a n dxg(x) are bounded for all x ∈ [0,1], and so they are integrable. Inte-




[1 − (1 − y)λθ10]
ρM [1 − (1 − y)λθ00]
N−ρM−1 dy.
Taking the limit M, N →∞(with N/M = b being ﬁxed) and using the deﬁnition of queue
lengths, I get: [1 − (1 − y)λθ10]
ρM → e−q10(1−y) and [1 − (1 − y)λθ00]
N−ρM−1 → e−q00(1−y).
38Thus, when visiting a seller who does not have a related buyer, a buyer is chosen to trade









Setting x =1y i e l d sg(1) that is the probability used in the main text.
B. Proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2
Let me prove Lemma 3.1 ﬁrst. Because p1 <U+ V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1), comparing (2.3) and
(2.6) yields v1s >v 01 (= v11). Then (2.2) implies θ11 = 0, as stated in (i) of the lemma.
Now, the results θ10 =0a n dθ1s = 1 are equivalent to each other. To prove θ10 =0 ,t h e r e
are two cases to consider. The ﬁrst case has v00 ≤ v01.I nt h i sc a s e ,v10 = v00 ≤ v01 <v 1s.
The strict inequality v10 <v 1s implies θ10 = 0. The second case has v00 >v 01.I nt h i sc a s e ,
θ00 =1 ,a n ds oq01 = 0. Recall that q11 =0( s i n c eθ11 = 0). From (2.12), I can compute





p1 {λθ1s[p1 − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] + J0(ρ+1)},s . t .( 2 . 7 ) .
If θ1s < 1, the seller can increase the payoﬀ by reducing p1 slightly to induce θ1s =1 .T h i s
price reduction does not change any other buyer’s choice, because the seller only attracts
his related buyer in this case. Thus, the reduction will increase the seller’s value, which
implies that θ1s < 1 cannot be equilibrium outcome. Now that θ1s =1 ,Ih a v eθ10 =0 .
To prove (ii) of Lemma 3.1, suppose θ00 =0( i . e . ,θ01 = 1), to the contrary. Since q00 =0
in this case, and since q10 = 0 (as a result of θ10 = 0), then (2.5) yields v00 = U−p0+V1(ρ+1).
A seller without a related buyer can set p0 = p1−ε,w h e r eε>0i ss u ﬃciently small. Doing
so will yield v00 >v 1s >v 01 and, hence, θ00 = 1 that contradicts the supposition θ01 =1 .
To prove (iii) of Lemma 3.1, note that θ01 > 0 implies v00 ≤ v01.S i n c ev1s >v 01,t h e n
v1s >v 00 = v10 in this case.
For (iv) of Lemma 3.1, note that v1s ≥ v10 = v00, where the inequality follows from
θ1s =1 .I fθ01 =0 ,t h ef o r m u l ao fJ1 in the above proof is valid. If v1s >v 00 in this case,
a seller with a related buyer can raise p1 slightly without disturbing the outcome θ1s =1 ,
thus increasing his payoﬀ. Therefore, v1s = v00 must hold if θ01 =0 .
Now turn to Lemma 3.2. As discussed in the main text, if (3.7) is binding for a type-1
seller, then such a seller can gain by deviating to ¯ p that attracts only the related buyer, and
39an equilibrium with partial mixing does not exist. So, suppose that (3.7) is not binding.
Then, a type-1 seller’s optimal choice q1 satisﬁes (3.9), the value function J1 satisﬁes
(3.10), and the relation q0 = h(q1) holds, where h is deﬁned in (3.11). I prove that these
conditions lead to the result J0(ρ) >J 1(ρ), which violates the equilibrium requirement
that it be optimal for a type-1 seller to give priority to the related buyer.
Because (1 + r)J0(ρ) is given by (3.3) and (1 + r)J1(ρ) by (3.10), the relation J0(ρ) >
J1(ρ)i se q u i v a l e n tt o :
1 − (1 + q0)e
−q0 >
[1 − (1 + q1)e−q1][1− (1 − λ)e−q1]
2
(1 − λ)[1− e−q1]
2 + λ[1 − (1 + q1)e−q1]
.
Here I have used the fact that ∆(ρ+1) > 0, where ∆ is deﬁned in (3.4). Substituting
q0 = h(q1) from (3.11), I rewrite the above condition as f(a,q1) < 0, where a temporarily
denotes a = 1





1+( a − 1)
1 − (1 + q)e−q
(1 − e−q)2
#)
− (a − 1)
[q1 +1− (2q1 +1 ) e−q1]
(1 − e−q1)2 .










1 − (1 + q)e−q
#−1
−
[q1 +1− (2q1 +1 ) e−q1]
(1 − e−q1)2 .





1 − e−q < 0f o ra l lq>0.
It is also easy to verify that
∂f(a,q)
∂a is decreasing in a for all q>0a n da l la>1. Thus, for






< 0, f(a,q) <f(1,q)=0 .
This establishes the result J0(ρ) >J 1(ρ) under partial mixing and, hence, proves that an
equilibrium with partial mixing does not exist. QED
C. Proof of Proposition 3.3 and the Computation of Dynamics
For part (i) of Proposition 3.3, it is clear that the steady state and the dynamics of ρ are
determined by (3.16), given the initial value of ρ.F o re a c hv a l u eo fρ on the dynamic path,
q0 is given by (3.15). Because (3.15) and (3.16) depend only on (λ,b), the steady state and
40the dynamics of (ρ,q0) depend on (λ,b) but not on other parameters such as (c,U). Let
me solve the steady state of (ρ,q0), denoted (ρ∗,q∗
0). In the steady state, ρ+1 = ρ = ρ∗,











.( C . 1 )





















.( C . 2 )
The steady-state values, (ρ∗,q∗
0), solve ρ∗ = ρ1(q∗
0)=ρ2(q∗
0). It is easy to verify that
ρ10(q) > 0, ρ1(0) = 0, ρ1(∞)= 1
2−λ < 1, ρ20(q) < 0, ρ2(0) = bλ > 0, and ρ2(∞)=0 .
Thus, there exists a unique q∗
0 ∈ (0,∞)t h a ts o l v e sρ1(q∗
0)=ρ2(q∗
0). The implied solution
for ρ∗ satisﬁes ρ∗ ∈ (0,1) because ρ1(q∗
0) ∈ (0,1). Also, ρ∗ <b λbecause ρ2(q∗
0) <b λ .T h u s ,
0 <ρ ∗ < min{1,bλ}, as it is stated in part (i) of the proposition. Also, it is straightforward





db > 0, and
dρ∗
dλ > 0.
Continuing the proof of part (i), I show that the steady state ρ∗ is locally stable. This
amounts to proving |G0(ρ∗)| < 1, where G is deﬁned in (3.16). Using (3.15) to compute
H0(ρ)=( q0 − λ)/(1 − ρ) ﬁrst and then G0,Ih a v e :
G
0(ρ)=( 1− λ + q0)e
−q0 − (1 − λ), where q0 = H(ρ).
Clearly, G0(ρ) > −(1−λ) > −1. Also, G0(ρ) <q 0e−q0 < 1. Thus, |G0(ρ)| < 1 for all ρ such
that q0 = H(ρ) > 0 and, clearly, for ρ = ρ∗.
F o rp a r t( i i ) ,l e tm eﬁrst presume ∆(ρ+1) > 0, which will be veriﬁed in part (iii), and
ﬁnd the conditions under which the requirements J1(ρ) ≥ J0(ρ) and (3.14) are satisﬁed.
Consider the condition J1(ρ) ≥ J0(ρ). Using (3.8) and V a
0 in (3.2), I can compute:
¯ p = U + V1(ρ+1) − V0(ρ+1) − e
−q0∆(ρ+1). (C.3)
Then, a type-1 seller’s expected surplus and the value function are
λ[¯ p − c + J1(ρ+1) − J0(ρ+1)] = λ(1 − e
−q0)∆(ρ+1), (C.4)
(1 + r)J1(ρ)=J0(ρ+1)+λ(1 − e
−q0)∆(ρ+1). (C.5)
41Comparing (C.5) with (3.3), I express the condition J1(ρ) ≥ J0(ρ)e q u i v a l e n t l ya s
q0
eq0−1 ≥
1 − λ. Because
q
eq−1 is a decreasing function of q for all q>0 and its value lies in (0,1),
this condition is equivalent to q0 ≤ qa(λ)w h e r eqa is deﬁned by the following equation:
qa
eqa − 1
=1− λ.( C . 6 )
Note that qa(λ) is an increasing function of λ. Moreover, because eλ < 1
1−λ for all λ ∈ (0,1),
it can be veriﬁed that λ
eλ−1 > 1 − λ, which implies qa(λ) >λ .
Now consider the condition (3.14), still under the presumption that ∆(ρ+1) > 0. Sub-
stituting ˜ p1 from (3.13), ¯ p from (C.3), and q0 = h(˜ q1), where h is deﬁned in (3.11), I can








q +( 1− λ)(1 − λ + q).




















Thus, f00(q) > 0 if and only if q>ln(1 + λ2
4 ). With the properties of f0(0) and f0(∞),
this result implies that there exists q4 ∈ (0, ln(1 + λ2
4 )) such that f0(q) > 0 if and only if
q>q 4. In turn, with the properties of f(0) and f(∞), this result implies that there exists
q5(λ) ∈ (q4,∞)s u c ht h a tf(q) > 0 if and only if q>q 5(λ). That is, f(˜ q1) ≤ 0 if and only if
˜ q1 ≤ q5(λ). It can be veriﬁed that h(q)d e ﬁned in (3.11) is an increasing function. Because
q0 = h(˜ q1), then ˜ q1 ≤ q5(λ) if and only if
q0 ≤ qb(λ) ≡ h(q5(λ)) ∈ (0,∞). (C.7)
Therefore, the requirement J1(ρ) ≥ J0(ρ) and the requirement (3.14) are both satisﬁed
if and only if q0 ≤ Q(λ), where Q(λ)i sd e ﬁned as
Q(λ)=m i n {qa(λ),q b(λ)} ∈ (0,∞). (C.8)
Because ρ2(q) <ρ 1(q) if and only if q>q ∗
0, the steady state of the equilibrium satisﬁes
q∗
0 ≤ Q(λ)i fa n do n l yi fρ2(Q(λ)) ≤ ρ1(Q(λ)), which can be rewritten as b ≤ B(λ)w h e r e
B(λ) ≡
λ[1 − e−Q(λ)]+( 1− λ)Q(λ)
λ[2 − λ − e−Q(λ)]
.( C . 9 )
42Together with part (i), this establishes that a steady state with complete separation exists
if and only if b ≤ B(λ). Under this condition, the steady state is unique. It is clear from
the deﬁnitions of qa(λ)a n dqb(λ)t h a tt h e yd e p e n do n l yo nλ and not on other parameters
such as c and U.T h u s ,Q(λ)a n dB(λ) depend only on λ and not on (c,U).
For part (iii), note that the construction of the price ¯ p in (3.8) implies v1s(ρ, ¯ p)=V a
0 (ρ).
Hence, (2.1) implies V1(ρ)=V0(ρ). Substituting V a
0 from the ﬁrst condition in (3.2) into
(2.1) for i = 0 yields the expression for V in (3.19). Combining the two conditions in (3.2)
to eliminate V a
0 yields the expression for p0 in (3.17) and substituting the result V1 = V0
into (C.3) yields the expression for ¯ p in (3.18). Because
q
1−e−q > 1f o ra l lq>0a n d∆ > 0,
it is clear that ¯ p>p 0. Let me delay the proof of ¯ p>c .
To derive the dynamic equation for ∆ in (3.20) and verify ∆(ρ) > 0f o rρ near the










The deﬁnition of ∆(ρ) in (3.4) and the result V1 = V0 then imply the dynamic equation
for ∆ in (3.20). Setting ∆(ρ)=∆(ρ+1)=∆∗ and q0 = q∗
0 in (3.20), I obtain:
∆
∗ =
(1 + r)(U − c)
1+r − λ(1 − e−q∗
0)+1− (1 + q∗
0)e−q∗
0 .( C . 1 1 )
Because r>0, 1 >λ (1 − e−q∗
0), 1 > (1 + q∗
0)e−q∗
0 and U>c ,t h e n∆∗ > 0. If ρ is close to
ρ∗,t h e nq0 = H(ρ)i sc l o s et oq∗
0,i nw h i c hc a s e∆(ρ)i sc l o s et o∆∗ and, hence, positive.
With (C.11) and (3.18), I can deduce that ¯ p∗ >cif and only if
(1 + r − λ)(1 − e
−q∗





Note that the left-hand is an increasing function of q∗
0 and its value is 0 if q∗
0 =0 .B e c a u s e
q∗
0 > 0, then the left-hand side is strictly greater positive, indeed. This implies that if ρ is
close to ρ∗,t h e n¯ p>c .
Finally, I describe the procedure of computing the dynamics of the equilibrium. Starting
with any initial value of ρ, the dynamic path of ρ can be solved by repeatedly using
(3.16). For each ρ on this dynamic path, the value of q0 is given by q0 = H(ρ), where
H is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 5 ) . L e t{ρ+t}∞
t=0 be the path of ρ and {q0,+t}∞
t=0 the path of q0.T o
solve the dynamics of other variables, let me start with ∆, the total surplus of a match.
43From (3.20), it is clear that ∆ obeys a linear diﬀerence equation whose coeﬃcients are
time-varying due to the dynamics of q0.T a k i n g T to be a suﬃciently large number and
choosing ∆(ρ+T)t ob es u ﬃciently close to the new steady state level of ∆, I can iterate
on (3.20) backward to obtain the sequence {∆(ρ+t)}T
t=0. Similarly, I can iterate on (3.19)
backward to obtain {Vi(ρ+t)}T
t=0 and on (3.3) to obtain {J0(ρ+t)}T
t=0. Then, (C.10) gives
{J1(ρ+t)}T
t=0. Substituting the dynamic paths of q0 and ∆ into (3.17) and (3.18) yields the
dynamic paths of p0 and p1. Similarly, substituting the dynamic paths of (ρ,q0,p 0,p 1)i n t o
(3.21) - (3.25) yields the dynamic paths of the probability, length, and the price discount
o fas a l ea sw e l la st h em a r k u p s . QED
D. Proof of Proposition 5.1
F o r( i ) ,n o t et h a tas t e a d ys t a t ew i t hc omplete separation and endogenous b exists if and
only if the steady-state value b∗ satisﬁes b∗ ≤ B(λ), where B is deﬁn e di n( C . 9 ) . T h i s
requirement requires equivalently that (5.1) should have a solution for q∗
0 which satisﬁes
q∗
0 ≤ Q(λ), where Q is deﬁned in (C.8). Temporarily denote the left-hand side of (5.1)
as LHS(q∗
0). Because (1 − e−q)a n d[ 1− (1 + q)e−q]a r ei n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n so fq,t h e n
LHS(q) is a decreasing function. Because LHS(0) = ∞ > 0, (5.1) has a solution for q∗
0
that satisﬁes q∗
0 ≤ Q(λ) if and only if LHS(Q(λ)) ≤ 0. I express this condition as





1+r − λ(1 − e−Q(λ))
1 − [1 + Q(λ)]e−Q(λ) +1
#
.( D . 1 )
Clearly, K>0. Also, under (D.1), the solution for q∗
0 to (5.1) is unique, and so the solution
for b∗ to (3.15) is unique.
For (ii), it is easy to verify from (5.1) that dq∗
0/dc > 0. Because ρ∗ = ρ1(q∗
0), where ρ1














Because q/(1 − e−q) is an increasing function of q,t h er e s u l t sdq∗
0/dc > 0a n ddρ∗/dc > 0
imply that db∗/dc > 0.
To establish (iii), note that rJ∗
0 =[ 1−(1+q∗
0)e−q∗
0]∆∗. The free-entry condition J∗
0 = k
implies: ∆∗ = rk/[1 − (1 + q∗
0)e−q∗
0]. Substituting ∆∗ into (3.17) and (3.18) yields:
p
∗









1 = U −
rk e−q∗
0
1 − (1 + q∗
0)e−q∗
0 .
44Because both expressions are increasing functions of q∗
0,t h er e s u l tdq∗
0/dc > 0i m p l i e s
dp∗
0/dc > 0a n ddp∗











0 − 1 − q∗
0)
.
The derivative of this diﬀerence with respect to q∗


















Note that q − 1+e−q > 0a n d1− (1 + q)e−q > 0 for all q>0. Also, the function
[(2 − q)eq − 2 − q]i se q u a lt o0w h e nq = 0, and its derivative with respect to q is equal
to −[(q − 1)eq +1 ]< 0. Thus, the function is negative for all q>0. These results
imply that the above expression for (p∗
1 − p∗
0)d e c r e a s e si nq∗
0.B e c a u s e dq∗
0/dc > 0, then
d(p∗
1−p∗
0)/dc < 0. Finally, using the above expression for p∗
1 to compute (p∗
1−c)a n du s i n g
(5.1) to substitute (U − c), I obtain:
p
∗
1 − c = rk
"
1+
(1 + r − λ)eq∗
0 + λ − 1
eq∗




The derivative of this expression with respect to q∗
0 has the same sign as that of
(1 − λ)(1 − e
−q∗
0) − (1 + r − λ)q
∗
0.
Because r>0, this expression is less than (1 − λ)[1 − e−q∗
0 − q∗
0] < 0. Thus, (p∗
1 − c)
decreases in q∗
0 and, hence, decreases in c. QED
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